

Wm Wood Esq
Ch. Ch.

THOUGHTS
ON A
PEACE WITH FRANCE;
WITH SOME
OBSERVATIONS
ON
MR. BURKE'S TWO LETTERS.

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MR. BURKE'S TWO LETTERS,
ON
PROPOSALS FOR PEACE
WITH THE
REGICIDE DIRECTORY.

QUANTUM IN ME FUIT JECI FUNDAMENTA PACIS.

PHIL. I.

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1796.

THOUGHTS

ON A

PEACE WITH FRANCE



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MR. BURKE'S TWO LETTERS

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OF

PROPOSALS FOR PEACE

WITH THE

RESIDENT DIRECTOR

OF THE BRITISH MUSEUM

LONDON

PRINTED BY J. JOHNSON, ST. PAUL'S CHURCH-YARD

1790

THOUGHTS,

&c.

THE celebrated letters I have lately perused, from the extravagant title they bear, and the implacable sentiments they breathe, are strongly marked with that indiscreet zeal which characterises their author: yet, in the present posture of public affairs they are entitled to much attention, from the variety of reflections they suggest, and the influence they are calculated to produce on the public mind. It is not a matter of small moment, that in the present crisis a proper tone should be given to the national voice; and I have always thought it as much a public duty to endeavour to counteract wrong impressions, as it is to disseminate right ones. With this view I have ventured to trouble the public on the present occasion; and however I may differ from Mr. Burke in his observations, or condemn the intemperate language in which they are conveyed,

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yet I readily admit that the same strength of thought, the same luxuriancy of stile, the same richness and variety of imagery, runs through his whole performance, which in other works of the same author I have often admired, and which I think no less conspicuous in this.

One proposition of his struck me with a mixture of astonishment and regret. I am anxious to consider it, because, whilst the present negotiation is pending, it appears to me of great importance that such a proposition should not receive the assent of the nation, or indispose the country to a peace, if such should be the happy fruits of that negotiation.

Mr. Burke has advanced, that “neither the time chosen, nor the manner of soliciting a negotiation have been properly considered, even, says he, though I had allowed, (I hardly shall allow) that with the horde of regicides we could, by any selection of time, or use of means, obtain any thing deserving the name of peace.” I shall consider the latter clause of the sentence first. If by this horde of regicides, Mr. Burke means the governing powers of the country, that is, the Executive Directory, or by whatever name they are defined, then he scruples not to affirm, that, upon no terms, would he treat with such powers as the constitution of France has organized: but how long he would persevere in the war, for the contingency of such

such a change in the government as would reconcile him to a negotiation, or what that change must produce to give, in his opinion, validity and sanction to such a measure, he does not attempt to determine.

His ego nec metas rerum, nec tempora pono.

But if his serious objection is to treating *with regicide*, I would ask, unless what has been termed a counter-revolution takes place, (a favourite idea of Mr. Burke's, but which receives no countenance, except from the warmth of his own wishes upon the subject, and is now, I believe, universally exploded) whilst the present republican form of government subsists, how is it possible that the governing powers of the country can exonerate themselves from the imputation which attaches upon them, in common with the rest of the French nation, the having been accessary to the death of the late King? Detesting and abhorring that fatal act as much as Mr. Burke, and believing it to have cast more odium on the actors in the revolution than any other measure of their government, I may yet be permitted to doubt whether it is altogether decorous in an Englishman to dwell on an expression, which is liable to be retorted upon him, and which must recall the memory of his own national dishonour, not yet obliterated by the lapse of a century and an half; but, waving the offensiveness of the expression, what, I would ask, does so indefinite and perpetuated a state

of warfare lead to, but that which the civilized part of mankind, in all ages, have looked upon with horror; I mean a war of extermination. This must be the end and object of a contest which is to have no such assignable period, as the fortune of war, its changes, and its chances, may suggest, but is to be carried on till the existing government of one or both countries is fundamentally changed: so far the argument must be carried against treating with the horde of regicides, or it means nothing. Seldom in ancient, even in barbarous times, have we read of such determined hostility. *Delenda est Carthago*, is a sound which must have vibrated with horror on the stern ear of a Roman; the melancholy sight drew tears from its conqueror. How then, in this enlightened age, improved as we are by the accession of knowledge, the sentiments of philosophy, the mild precepts of religion, can we hold a language so much at variance with every improvement, which the condition of man has attained?

But putting this matter in another light, and presuming, what I conceive will not be denied, that the acts of any nation, constituted like that of France, must be considered as evidence of the nation's will; then I ask, is not this aversion to treat with any description of men, exercising the powers of government in France, upon the ground of their being objectionable, from the part they have acted in the revolution, the very thing of all others Mr. Burke most complains of in the conduct of the French towards this

this country? Is it not making an appeal from the governors to the governed? Setting up an opposition between the people and their rulers; affecting to discredit the one as the constitutional organ of the other? Mr. Burke could hardly contend that it is unsafe, or unadvisable, to make peace on honorable terms with the French nation, and yet he draws the distinction he complains of between the nation and its governors, by saying, that we can obtain nothing deserving the name of peace with the horde of regicides, &c. &c. that is, with those whom the voice of the nation, and the existing law of the land, has called to the exercise of the government of the country. This is an error which Mr. Burke surely was not sensible of committing; for this is the strong preliminary objection to negotiating a peace, which Mr. Burke makes, on the ground of the official note, published at the time of demanding a passport for Lord Malmesbury.

Having thus disposed of the clause in Mr. Burke's proposition, I shall recur to the examination of the proposition itself, namely, "whether the time chosen, "and the manner of soliciting a negotiation, have "been improperly considered?" This inquiry will depend on a review of the events of the war, the nature of our alliances, the situation of the country, its probable resources, and, lastly, the general sense and wishes of the nation, as far as they can be collected out of Parliament, on the subject of peace or war.

war. I shall summarily consider these topics, with as much impartiality as a man connected with no party, and unknown to all parties, can summon to an investigation of this nature. I will not disturb the *vexata quæstio*, of whether the war was just and necessary in its origin, whether it might have been avoided by well-timed explanation, whether the national honour required us to make no concession; my present business is with peace, such a one as Great Britain may treat for with the dignity belonging to a great nation, and with the security which ought to be the basis of every serious negotiation.

The leading character of this war has always appeared to me different from any which has preceded it; it was not a war of ambition or of conquest; it was not a war of defence; but it was a war produced by alarm, and that of a peculiar nature. We took up arms to combat opinions. Mr. Burke, in one of the most distinguished compositions of the present, or perhaps of any age, founded the alarm; he gave a strong impulse to the public mind; the scope and tenor of his late work corresponds with the former: he wishes to persuade the nation not to lay down its arms, because the opinions he would still combat remain in full force, unaffected by the events and operations of the war. These are the sentiments of an individual. But, perhaps, we must look for the motives of our national conduct

duct in the extraordinary circumstances of the times. We witnessed a fight perfectly new, to which the records of no history, ancient or modern, can furnish a parallel; we saw a great and powerful nation long ruled by the iron hand of power, accustomed to servitude, and seemingly proud of the chain it wore, start at once into a new and self-created existence. We were interested in its fate, we were placed too near by our local situation not to feel tremblingly alive to every movement of this new orb, every variation in its eccentric course, which might by possibility affect our own political world. We saw this nation successful in arms abroad, extravagant in her councils at home; we perceived her intoxicated with success, and we began to form the proud design of bridling her fury. The decree of fraternization, and the over-running of Holland, roused us to immediate action.

Tum primum spargere voces
In vulgum ambiguas, et querere conscius arma.

How far our interference was necessary or prudent; how far it was calculated to meet the end designed; how well we had measured the resources of the enemy, and the probable issue of such a contest, it is not for my present purpose to inquire. That war is the severest scourge with which Providence has visited mankind, that if possible it ought to be avoided, that it ought only to be resorted to in extreme and desperate cases, and when all means of
nego-

negotiation have failed; are truths which no serious thinker will controvert; which in a commercial country, and a country which nearly engrosses the commerce of the world, no wise statesman will dispute. Be this as it may, we engaged in the war, we liberated Holland from the danger that threatened her, we grew in our turn puffed up with our early success. The victories we gained opened the door to greater undertakings; new romantic views were proposed, we talked confidently of marching to Paris, and the old, reasonable, sober design of saving Holland was forgot as soon as it was accomplished.

Having fairly embarked in the cause as principals, we continued as principals to exert all our strength, and strain every nerve in the contest; our preparations were great, our expences were enormous. The navy was placed on such a footing as it has never been in any former war; the army was increased to a magnitude unknown before in the annals of the country. We seemed to have all nations in our alliance, or co-operating with us in a common cause. The Empire, Prussia, Spain, Sardinia, Naples, the Pope, most of the Electors, and innumerable smaller states, all voluntarily, or by the inducement of subsidies, fighting our battles; much was to be expected from such union of interests, such apparent co-operation of strength. Never before, perhaps, had such mighty powers leagued

together against a common enemy : but what have been the fruits of this union ? Have they corresponded to the expectations formed of it ? Has France been destroyed by the tempest which threatened her ; or has she rode out the storm, more firmly established in power, and possessed of an immense increase of territory ? This part of the subject is a painful one ; it is mortifying to a great and proud nation like this to contemplate the events of the war, because it is only to enumerate the victories of the enemy. The Austrian Netherlands are incorporated with France, and Holland is no longer an independent republic ; Savoy and Nice, the keys of Italy, nay, almost all Italy itself, belongs to her. The great towns upon the Rhine, a large tract of country on the left of that river, the important territory of Liege, these are all swallowed up in the vortex of French conquests. Truly afflicting as these events are, they ought to be fairly stated, because in discussing the eligibility of a negotiation for peace, it is necessary to consider what the enemy has already gained, what we and our allies have already lost, what the difference is in the relative situation of the powers at war, and what the probable consequences will be to each of a further continuance of hostility. Many reflections here naturally present themselves. That France has, alone and unassisted, been able to cope successfully with four of the greatest powers in Europe, not to mention a train of lesser states ; that she has been able to di-

vide and dissolve their union, and to attach two of those powers to her interest, must be a matter of astonishment to us and to posterity, and can only be accounted for from that enthusiastic ardor, which in ancient times, under similar circumstances, had animated other states in defence of their liberties against innumerable hosts of invaders,

But it may be alledged, though Prussia has found it her interest to make peace with France, though Spain has been compelled to do so, though the German Princes, the Pope, and the Italian States, &c. have all worshipped and bent the knee to this Baal, and though Austria has had some of her finest and most flourishing provinces torn from her; yet Great Britain has obtained possessions in the East and in the West Indies, her navies have rode in triumph, and her commerce has been protected; therefore though the allies have suffered, Great Britain has been a gainer by the war. The premises are true, but, alas! the conclusion is false; we have had, as Mr. Burke observes, some advantages “ambiguous in their nature and dearly bought;” we have, it is true, in every part of this war, displayed that active courage and steady perseverance which marks our national character. Our fleets and our armies have been eager to signalize themselves, they have nobly done so in many instances; but our blood has been shed, and our treasure has been expended to no efficient purpose. We are now at
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the close of the fourth year of the war, and we are not one step nearer any one determinate object for which the war was undertaken. " We have not in " the slightest degree impaired the strength of the " enemy in any one of those points in which his particular force consisted.

We have incurred a debt of an hundred and twenty millions, which presses heavy on us, which every hour the war continues will press with an increasing weight, and must be transmitted from us to our latest posterity, imposing on them a burden we ourselves are hardly able to bear. This is not all, by this legacy of debt we leave behind us, we dry up the spring of those resources, which in every well-regulated state ought to be considered as appropriated to exigencies of extreme peril, and to what may strictly be called a war of defence. If it be asked, why I am thus anxious for the interests of posterity, I answer, that I am anxious for the durable greatness of this empire, and that I think its weak and vulnerable part is on the side of its finances. Without anticipating any remote or improbable evil, I think I see impending ruin in another war of any duration, before a long peace has in some measure healed the wounds, which public credit has received in this expensive contest. The vessel of the state has had an able pilot at the helm; but if I may continue the metaphor, she has long carried a great press of sail;

she must now come into port to refit, or she will sink
 in the gathering storm. Let any man consider the
 present difficulties the minister has to encounter; the
 resources he has had within his grasp from a variety
 of causes, principally from the great confidence he
 has enjoyed amongst monied men, as a minister of
 revenue; then let him contemplate the dearth of spe-
 cie universally prevailing at this moment, the mise-
 rable delays and shifts of government, the disgrace-
 ful arrears of the civil list, the postponement of pay-
 ment in the lottery, and the disorder reigning in
 every department of finance, and he will entertain
 little doubt of the minister's distress. But if he has
 courage to ruminate on that great measure, which is
 said to be in agitation; that giant project which is to
 supersede the necessity of future loans, which, by its
 boldness will astonish; by its resemblance to the re-
 quisitions in France, will alarm the public mind, he
 will doubtless recoil at the prospect before him, and
 will think he sees at no very great distance, the pub-
 lic credit of this country tottering and nodding to
 its fall. I am aware that speculations of this kind are
 unpopular; they must be so in their nature; it is like
 telling a sick man he is at the point of death: they
 must be unpopular, because they arrest the progress
 of gay and flattering hopes, and recall the mind to
 sober, often to melancholy trains of thought; but
 they are not the less necessary because somewhat
 painful. I admit that the same note has been so re-
 peatedly

peatedly chaunted for above half a century, that it grates upon the ear, and is now

“ But as the cuckoo is in June;

“ Heard—not regarded.”

But I, for one, can neither be insensible nor indifferent to any occurrence which accelerates the evil I contemplate.

By what I have said, it is the farthest from my intentions to decry or under-rate the resources of this country : I know that they are great, and if called into action by the necessity of the occasion ; if called for now, by a refusal on the part of the French to treat for peace on fair and honourable terms, they will, I doubt not, be found equal to a great and glorious stand ; the efforts of the country will then be directed to a noble end—the defence of its liberties. All voices will join, all hands will unite, and the only competition will then be, who shall be foremost in promoting the safety, the honour, and the welfare of his country.

But at present, in the impoverished state of our finances, in the vast increase of the national debt, in the necessity of fresh taxes to an enormous amount, or what is worse to a measure of finance, resembling a forced loan, sufficiently strong and prevailing arguments present themselves to sanction the measure

of negotiation, and to shew that the selection of time at least has been well made. The use of means is so much the province of the executive government, and at present so imperfectly known to us, that it can hardly form the subject of discussion. Yet the sentiments and wishes of the nation to a certain degree may be collected upon this head, and I will venture to express what I conceive them to be.

In the arrangement of this negotiation, I take it to be the first desire of all parties in this kingdom, that good faith should be preserved with our allies, and that Great Britain should treat for no peace, which does not comprehend them. This is an indispensable preliminary, which seems in a great measure to have been already accorded. But I am inclined to think the dispositions of the nation go further; for as innumerable, perhaps insurmountable difficulties would stand in the way of so comprehensive a treaty, unless Great Britain consented to make some sacrifices, I believe the people of this country, with a disinterestedness congenial to their national character, would wave some of the advantages they possess, if by so doing they could purchase for the allies the desirable blessings of peace. Perhaps the first sacrifice this country will have to make, is a sacrifice of her pride, in a formal unequivocal recognition of the French Republic. This she was obliged to do in the American war; and considering the circumstances of that war, it must have cost her infinitely more pain then,
because

because we had habituated ourselves to call the Americans rebels and traitors, though at last we dignified their rebellion, by acknowledging their independence. Such a lesson, so deeply imprinted, one would think, might have taught any man more prudence than to deal out gross, offensive epithets, and indiscriminately to apply to the chief actors in the revolution, the terms regicides and assassins, banditti and barbarians.

Another sacrifice, more costly than the former is, a resignation of some of the conquests we have made. I am aware that here I tread on tender ground; but if I venture to hazard conjectures, I quarrel with no man who can form more plausible ones than mine.

It will be agreed on all hands, that a demand must be made on France to surrender some part of her conquests on the continent. Some equivalent must be given on our part, because none of the other powers have any thing to concede. This is what Mr. Burke states as an insurmountable objection to a peace. I do not see the matter in that light. I see that the arrangement will be attended with difficulty; but in this great work of humanity, the restoration of peace to Europe, on a solid basis, I see nothing that should alarm; I see every thing that should animate the exertions of a minister.

“ Tu ne cede malis, sed contra audentior ito.”

Whether

Whether the sacrifices we are disposed to make be in the East or West Indies, must depend in a great measure on the footing upon which Holland is placed by the peace. Holland was the immediate cause or pretext of the war; but she is now converted from an ally to an enemy: if she continues under the protection and influence of France, (and it is not probable that France will resign her) then we shall be anxious to retain the possessions we have gained by the war in the East, because they have been made chiefly at the expence of Holland: of this nature is the Cape of Good Hope, the value of which to us will depend much on the relation in which we stand to Holland at the peace. So that I draw a very different conclusion from Mr. Burke; for I contend, that in the sacrifices we make, (and I admit that some must be made) we have the means in our hands of adapting them very advantageously to the particular situation we shall stand in to other powers, at the conclusion of the war; and this is a reason why it will cost us less to make these sacrifices, than if they stood wholly unqualified in their nature and operation. But if, on the other hand, Holland recovers her former independence, if the Stadtholder is restored, and things are placed upon their ancient footing; then it will not be an object of our policy to degrade and weaken our late friend and ally, by retaining those possessions which formed, I may say, a constituent part of his greatness: in that case we shall look to the West Indies as the quarter in which
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the largest, perhaps the most painful concessions will be made : I say most painful, because we have purchased those conquests at the ever to be lamented expence of the best blood of this country. But even here we have, in my opinion, abundant source of consolation. When any friend of humanity looks at the dreadful mortality which now, for three years past has raged in that pestilential climate ; when he either reads in the gross the numbers who have fallen victims to the yellow fever, or when he contemplates in detail the individual sorrows of friends and relations ; when he observes that no mode of treatment, no means of precaution can rescue the unhappy sufferer from death, surely he does not feel a very strong appetite to retain those abodes of misery and horror, when year after year incredible numbers perish, and where military men go on a point of honour, as they would up to the mouth of a cannon, or any other more certain instrument of destruction.

Within these few days, and since I had written the former paragraph, I observe, that Mr. Burke has made an alteration in that part of his letter in which he speaks of the West Indies ; and I think it deserves to be noticed. He has depicted, in glowing colours, the ravages occasioned by the yellow fever, and he laments, that instead of waging war in a climate by nature hostile to the European constitution, we had not carried our arms into France, and directed our operations to that side of the coast, where

our army might have been supported by our navy; and where we should have been joined by eighty thousand Frenchmen, all animated by principles, by enthusiasm, and by vengeance.

I cannot but regret, that at a time when this country and its government is anxious to procure peace, and has taken decisive measures to obtain it, observations should be made by a man of Mr. Burke's political connections, which can only serve to irritate and inflame the minds of those with whom we are negotiating.

Carry fire and sword into the enemy's country, provided you can get a footing there, as soon as you please, when the negotiation is at an end; but why scatter fire-brands whilst in the very act of treating, and at the instant when we are holding out our hands in token of amity, peevishly lament that we have missed the opportunity of cutting our enemies throats.

If I could enter at large upon this part of the subject, I should not be disposed to coincide with Mr. Burke in his observations. The experience of this century has taught us, that with the troops we can bring into the field, no reasonable hopes can be entertained of making any serious impression on French ground. We have the example of the two wars before last, when we made, I will not say useless, but
fatal

fatal descents on the French coast; witness that frivolous expedition in the year 1746, under General Sinclair, and the more serious, but much more unfortunate attempt on St. Cas, in the year 1758, under General Bligh. It is true, if in this war we had sent a British army into France, "we might perhaps not have had to reckon on the loss of a man, who did not fall in battle." But I contend, that all we sent on this forlorn hope would have fallen victims to it. We should have applied with sorrow to ourselves, the well-known distich of antient Rome,

"Una dies Fabios ad bellum miserat omnes

"Ad bellum missos perdidit una dies."

I contend, that the army of the ocean, or any one of the numerous armies of France, would have swallowed up the small determined band we might have destined for that service; they would have fought their way back to the water's edge, as they did in the year 1758; and those whom the sword spared, the sea would have ingulphed. What was the event of the Quiberon expedition? the prologue, it should seem, to that bloody tragedy Mr. Burke is anxious to have brought upon the stage. Noble Frenchmen! brave, but unhappy victims of an ill-concerted expedition! you have, by your fate, set a stamp and seal on the folly of such measures, and demonstrated their impracticability to future ages!

As often as we speak of an attempt on the part of the French to invade this country, we treat it with ridicule, and we anticipate the destruction of the enemy, because we know the energy of men who fight in defence of their best and dearest treasure, the existence of their liberties. How forcibly then does the argument apply, when those who repel the attack are stronger and more numerous than those who make it in the proportion of three to one.

Much, therefore, as I lament with Mr. Burke the dreadful effects of that pestilential climate in which the war has been carried on, I cannot regret, that we have abstained from hazarding the dangerous experiment he recommends. This comfort I may take at least from the present circumstances of the war, that by having made conquests in the West Indies, which our fleets enable us to retain, though we cannot consider them as an indemnity for the expences of the war, we have something in our possession, which, if I may use the expression, we can at all times carry to market: we shall not go there empty handed; we have much to give up ourselves in exchange for the continental restitutions we mean to demand of the French. This will help, in some measure, to restore the political equilibrium; and in this point of view our tropical acquisitions assume an importance to which, perhaps, of themselves they are not intitled. What revenue they produce I care not;
if

if they facilitate the restoration of peace, I for one shall never think them unproductive.

No question of peace, as Mr. Burke observes, can be discussed on either side the water, without having such objects as these in view : though the public do not make the peace, they will reason upon it ; will criticise it, will sift its merits and its demerits, and having a great and deep interest at stake, they will exercise the privilege of discussion with unbounded freedom and familiarity. This is one of the prerogatives of a free country ; one of the signs of an enlightened age. No friend to rational freedom, perhaps, can wish it otherwise ; but then it is a matter of the first importance, that the public should reason rightly, and judge correctly. To do so they must have the matter fairly propounded to them ; they must understand the merits of the cause ; without this their hopes and their fears, their expectations and their disappointments, like those of children, will be arbitrary and capricious.

For such reasons as these I cannot but think it of importance, that the mischief Mr. Burke's letters are likely to produce, should be counteracted as much as possible, by a fair, impartial, unexaggerated statement of the true grounds and principles upon which this treaty must be conducted ; of the relative situation in which the contracting parties stand to each other ;

other; their separate views, and the mutual concessions which may reasonably be expected from each.

Since the first composition of the letters alluded to, some events have taken place, which may possibly operate even on that writer's mind, to reconcile him to the measure of negotiation. If our prospect of success in a continuance of the war was, from any circumstances, materially diminished; if, at a given period from the present hour, our ability of making peace was, from any probable cause, to be greatly narrowed and circumscribed, Mr. Burke would not seriously contend, that it would be wise and politic, in that case, at the price of our blood, and at the expence of our treasure, at the increase to a large daily amount of our national debt, to reduce ourselves to a condition less advantageous than the present for making a peace. No man in his senses would contend for such a proposition. Let us see, then, if any thing has happened lately, which may justify my supposition of such a case. Corsica is retaken, on the possession of which we heretofore laid such great stress, as affording us a port to refit, as furnishing a rallying point for our fleets, as the key, (for so we used to term it) of the Mediterranean and the coast of Italy. Will this make no difference in our prospect of success in those seas, where we constantly maintain a large fleet? When we add to this loss the shutting against us the port of Genoa, and the more than unfriendly disposition of Leghorn, can it be doubted, whether

whether a change is created for the worse in the aspect of our affairs in that quarter of the globe? But what is indeed of more consequence to us as a maritime power, because it materially affects us in a point in which we are accustomed to be most jealous, is, that Spain, long oscillating between her unwillingness to break with us, and her willingness to adopt the views of France, has at length declared herself: she has declared war against Great Britain, and we have a new great maritime power to contend with. I will not enter into her causes of complaint, as she has stated them in her manifesto; whether they are true or false, is foreign to my purpose to inquire; but I will only observe, that from this time forward we have to contend with France, fortified by the accession of Spain, fortified by the neutrality, (if indeed it is no worse) of Prussia, Sardinia, Naples, all the Italian states, by that of Bavaria, Saxony, &c. all of whom were parties in the confederacy with us against France; and, lastly, fortified by that conscious greatness, which the successful trial of her strength has undoubtedly inspired. It is very obvious what a change must be effected in the balance, by such weights taken out of our scale, and put into that of France: since it is manifest, by the experience we have had, that France, without these additions of strength, has been more than able to stand her ground; for if when Spain fought on our side, we effected nothing towards any one object for which the war was undertaken, we are not very likely, when Spain fights
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against us, in conjunction with France, to do more than we did before. In fact, is it not likely, (calculating the probabilities) that we shall do less? If so, the supposition I set out with, is not very extravagant, viz. that by a continuance of hostilities, we are less likely to be benefitted or advanced in any of the objects we proposed by the war; but, on the contrary, are likely to be more disabled and crippled in a negotiation for peace, let the time for making it come when it may, than we are at this moment.

In this manner, I apprehend the nation will reason out of Parliament. It is heartily tired of the war; it anxiously expects the blessings of peace. It is the people's interest at all times to desire peace rather than war, because the necessaries of life, and provisions of all kind, are infinitely cheaper in time of peace: it is peculiarly their interest now to wish for peace, because the great exertions of the country at this moment will unavoidably operate as hardships on the lower classes. The Supplemental Militia and Cavalry bills will subject the most industrious part of the community to the contingency, either of serving personally, or providing a substitute in the new armament. That this is not a matter of indifference to the bulk of the nation, but that it will be severely felt by large and numerous classes of men, nobody can doubt. This measure, therefore, however necessary it may be deemed as a measure of defence, becomes a new motive for the people to wish for peace,

peace, and eagerly to seize any conjuncture, which may be the means of procuring them so great a blessing.

But Mr. Burke points his opposition not only at the measure, but the manner of treating; and he enters at some length into the history of King William and Queen Anne's wars, in the course of which he contends, that all the overtures of peace came from the enemy. I cannot agree with Mr. Burke in many of the observations he makes on that period of our history. Speaking of King William's conduct, after the discouraging representations made to him by his ministers, of the disposition of the nation to a new war, he says, "His Majesty did determine, and did
"take and pursue his resolution. In all the tottering
"imbecility of a new government, and with a Parlia-
"ment totally unmanageable, he persevered." Did he so? and is this the language Mr. Burke applauds as constitutional? Lay aside, for a moment, the successes which Mr. Burke supposes to have attended that war, and let me ask, if King William, or any king upon the throne of these realms, with a Parliament totally unmanageable, that is, with a Parliament totally averse to the war, ought to have persevered in it? "In spite of his people," says Mr. Burke, "he resolved to make them great and glorious." Yet, after all that has been done for them, could this ungrateful people now rise up and apostrophise King William, might they not exclaim, in the language of the man who wished to remain in

that state of distraction he had been accustomed to enjoy :

Pol ! me occidistis amici

Non servastis.

What, if after all the successes of that long war, continued, as it may be said to have been, through much the greater part of the next reign, such heavy expences were incurred as laid the foundation for that superstructure of national debt, which is ready now to fall and crush us to atoms ?

In this view of the subject the glorious perseverance of the monarch has been eventually the ruin of posterity, and the reputation we acquired in the eyes of Europe has been dearly purchased at the expence of our best comforts, and the surrender, (I do not overrate it) of more than one half of all our possessions. But as I have read that portion of history, there appears to me a fallacy in blending the two wars of King William and Queen Anne, and considering them as one. The grounds of them were not the same ; the fortunes of them were widely different. The principal ground of the first war for ten years after the revolution, was to compel France to acknowledge King William. The subordinate ground was to recover Hudson's Bay. " After ten years fighting to little purpose," says a celebrated writer of that age ; " after the loss of above an hundred thousand men, and a debt remaining of twenty millions,

“ lions, we at length hearkened to the terms of
 “ peace, which was concluded with great advantages
 “ to the Empire and Holland, but none at all to
 “ us.” His opinion of the success of that war does
 not accord very well with Mr. Burke’s, but, if the
 former is to be depended on, it strengthens the ob-
 servation I make on the perseverance of King Wil-
 liam, in carrying on a war against the sense of Par-
 liament, and the wishes of the people,

In Queen Anne’s war, which was founded on that
 grand alliance, which had been formed in the pre-
 ceding reign, and had for its great object the reduc-
 tion of the French power, we were wonderfully suc-
 cessful under the Duke of Marlborough; we gained
 many battles, and we acted a great part on the thea-
 tre of Europe; but we incurred at the same time a
 debt of sixty millions, and, though we gathered
 many laurels, we suffered the Dutch to reap all the
 solid advantages of that long and expensive contest.

But, returning from this historical digression to the
 observation which gave rise to it, in the war we have
 been speaking of every proposition of peace came from
 the enemy. What is there so extraordinary in this?
 It was natural they should; in the common course of
 human affairs, the first overture generally comes
 from the weaker side. It was so in the beginning of
 this century; it is so at the latter end of it. Classing
 ourselves with our allies, and unreservedly adopting
 their interests, we must be considered, (whatever

our separate achievements may have been) as that of the powers at issue, which has suffered most by the war, and therefore it is neither extraordinary nor disgraceful that we should be the first to make proposals for peace. But after all, what are "the trifling points of honor, the light ceremonies, the undefinable punctilios," as Mr. Burke justly terms them, which ought to stand in the way of so beneficial a work, as that of terminating the miseries of war. I cannot help thinking that the age, as it grows older, grows wiser; it looks to substantial interests, and despises the little unmeaning forms which impede them.

But, says Mr. Burke, "nothing can so completely ruin any of the old governments, our's in particular, as the acknowledgment directly, or by implication, of any kind of superiority in this new power." He has not explained what there is in the nature and constitution of this new power, to justify his assertion; but he seems to consider the overtures of peace originating in us, as that acknowledgment of superiority which he so strongly deprecates. Now, if two nations go to war, whatever is the cause of their quarrel, it must be expected that one of the two shall be a gainer, the other a loser, by the war. This is the mutual object for which they have recourse to arms. When peace is made, it much more frequently happens that the *uti possidetis* is the basis of the negotiation, than the *status quo*.

quo. I do not mean to say that the latter never happens, but not often, because, in the latter case, the losses sustained in the course and progress of the war must have been so equally balanced, as to leave no sensible alteration in the respective condition of the parties. But if, after the trial of strength has been made, and victory has inclined on one side, and no reasonable hopes are entertained of turning the fortune of the war; if then no overtures of peace were to be made by the power which has suffered most, lest they should be deemed an indirect acknowledgment of the enemy's superiority, then this ridiculous pride would either lead to the total overthrow and destruction of one of the powers at issue, or would so retard the event of a peace as to render it useless when it did take place, and incapable of repairing the miseries occasioned by the war.

But let us examine a little what there is in the present situation of France, to make this indirect acknowledgment of superiority so ruinous to us, and to all the old governments of Europe. Is it that the ambition and lust of power, in the new Republic, is more strong, and more dangerous, than it was in the old monarchy? This cannot fairly be contended, because, whatever may have been the mad and extravagant language of individuals, or whatever sanction that language has at times received from public authority, whilst the Jacobin interest prevailed,

prevailed, a milder system of government has introduced more moderate councils, and a formal disclaimer has been since made of all interference in the internal government of other kingdoms. But facts speak stronger than any language. I would desire those who are in the habit of pronouncing the enormities which have been committed in France, since the Revolution, to be unparalleled in history, to look back to the times of Louis the Fourteenth. In all his wars we may observe that monarch's vanity feeding his ambition; we may see his court, that perennial spring of flattery and corruption, administering to his vanity, and both constantly disturbing the peace of Europe.

This, I think, is not an exaggerated statement, but one justified by the history of the age. Can we say, unless we adopt Mr. Burke's prejudices, as well as his mode of reasoning, that (making allowances for the different situations of the country, and the dispositions of men's minds) the burning of the Palatinate and the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, were less cruel in their operation, less injurious to the interests of humanity, than the most oppressive act (select any you please) which has disgraced the French government since the Revolution? I except the tyranny of Robespierre, because I consider that usurpation as an interregnum in the new Republic, since marked with the execrations of the people, and which cannot, therefore, with any fairness, be opposed to my representation.

What

What is it, then, that makes all communication with France so dangerous? Is it imagined that her aversion to a monarchical form of government, and her love and veneration for that she has adopted, is of an infectious nature, and likely to prove epidemic in this country? Surely a war, which must inevitably increase the burthens of the people, and perpetuate them to distant ages, is not a very efficacious remedy to be applied to such a disorder: it is not the means of endearing the government to the people. But this cannot be the motive assigned; because so little resemblance subsisted between our government and the old government of France, that the causes which operated to the destruction of the one, cannot possibly be supposed to bear upon the other. So long as the corruptions and oppressions of the French monarchy have no footing in this country, so long as our constitution retains its beauty and its vigour, we have nothing to fear from any aversion in the people to their government; nothing from a disposition to exchange the monarchy of England for the Republic of France. The attachment which, with the exception of a few abandoned men, the outcasts of the state, who have no interest in its welfare, men of all ranks, in their several stations, shew to the sovereign on the throne, and his personal virtues, which secure and rivet that attachment, are so many pledges of the continuance of their affections, and serve to refute all the malevolent imputations of their disloyalty.

But

But, if the bulk of the people are well affected to the constitution, which I believe to be the case, in spite of the libellous calculation lately made, and the precise number of eighty thousand denounced as incorrigible Jacobins, it is surely a matter of great importance to retain the people in these sentiments, and to make the government under which they live an object of their love.

Ut ameris, amabilis esto.

This is the surest means to repel all inroad of innovation at home, all disposition to imitate the changes abroad. The body politic, like the body natural, is less susceptible of infectious communication when in a sound and robust state, than it is in a state of languor and decay.

But let us turn our thoughts to the condition of France in the event of a peace. War cannot last for ever; the time must come when peace, 'with healing in her wings,' will be restored to Europe. Then it is that Mr. Burke contemplates with alarm the neighbourhood of France; and in this part of his letter (in which his lively imagination appears to me to have run away with his riper judgment) he applies the Roman law of Vicinage to the *jus gentium*.

I wish to examine this question, and to see how the argument stands. The learned gentleman has

laid down the law of civil vicinity correctly, but he endeavours to apply it, by analogy, from what takes place in the case of private communities, to those broad principles of universal equity which dictate the law, and govern the conduct of nations, in their respective intercourse with each other. He observes, " that it has ever been the method of public jurists " to draw a great part of the analogies, on which " they form the law of nations, from the principles " of law which prevail in civil community." This I admit to be necessary and unavoidable; for, as in disputes between nations there is no power of appeal, which can by possibility be lodged any where to hear and determine the cause in question, no magistrate to apply to, no public tribunal to which they can resort, it is necessary that, in framing that unwritten law, which justice, and reason, and usage, have established, every assistance should have been derived from those partial and local regulations, which separate states have, from time to time, adopted for their mutual ease and convenience; and, therefore, I do not contend that no possible case might be put, in which even the private regulations of one state would not virtually be an infraction of that common law, which is made for the benefit of all countries. But I maintain, that to consider any particular form of government, which has been established by the will of the people, who compose the state, as necessarily hostile and repugnant to the existence of another state, and therefore as a nuisance

abateable, is such a monstrous and unreasonable assumption as will vitiate all the reasoning built upon it, however incontestably the conclusion would follow from the premises laid down; and therefore I am unprepared to assent to the Declaration, published October 29, 1793, which is the foundation of Mr. Burke's argument, and on which he has so ingeniously commented. "This state of things cannot exist in France, without involving all the surrounding powers in one common danger, without giving them the right, without imposing it on them as a duty, to stop the progress of an evil, which attacks the fundamental principles by which mankind is united in civil society." If this be the case, we have very ill performed our duty. But I say it is an assumption unwarranted by any thing but suspicion and conjecture; that all the surrounding powers must be involved in one common danger, by the destruction of the French monarchy, or the establishment of the French Republic, or by any other form of government which the caprice of the multitude, or even the tyranny of an individual, might institute. The complexion of their government may be unfavourable to our interests, and therefore may be regarded with a jealous eye; their internal provisions may be held in detestation for their immorality or injustice; but that any innovation, any alteration, in the constitution of another nation, should endanger the political existence of this country, and justify the commencement of hostilities

ilities on that ground, is a proposition more easily advanced than substantiated by argument.

But, following the train of Mr. Burke's Reflections, what will be the probable views of France on a peace, and to what objects will her policy be directed? At present she is in possession of all that her ambition can desire. She has successfully resisted the coalition formed against her: she has converted most of her enemies into friends, or forced them to be neutral: she has acquired a vast accession of territory; but, on the other hand, her finances are exhausted, her commerce is ruined, her manufactures are defaced, her laws and interior regulations want the tone and energy of a well-knit and strongly-compacted government. Will not then her policy induce her to remedy these evils? Will her attention be diverted from these important objects to the embroiling the peace and tranquillity of other nations? Such conduct would be as foolish as it would be flagitious; her true line of policy is plainly marked out for her. The industry and the activity of her inhabitants will be directed to the re-establishment of her commerce, and the restoration of her manufactures. The sinking credit of her funds must be supported by a patient and diligent application to these objects. They will be sufficient of themselves to engross all her care, to fix and to concentrate her attention.

Through such mediums as these I have for some time past contemplated the event of a peace: perhaps it may be objected to me, that, in this part of the subject, I have thought and spoken more highly of the enemy than, with deference to honest prejudices, I ought to have done. I wish that unintentionally I may have erred on that side; but this I am sure of, that to despise and vilify an enemy is not a mark of a wise or generous spirit; to vilify him when he is crowned with success, and at a time when we are desirous of negotiating with him for peace, is a conduct so marked with folly and inconsistency, that I hardly know how it admits of an apology.

But the same spirit which has dictated the language of Mr. Burke's letter, pervades all his reasoning on the subject of making peace with France. The total alteration which has taken place in the constitution and government of that country, he cannot yet consider as either sanctioned by the success which has attended the measure, or the time which has elapsed since the alteration took place. He does not seem to object to the organization of the Republic, the internal provisions of its policy, the detailed parts of its system, but to its novelty.

Non quia crasse

Compositum illepidevè putetur, sed quia nuper.

“ It is not,” says he, “ an old structure which you have found as it is, and are not to dispute of the original end and design with which it had been
been

been so fashioned; it is a recent wrong, and can
 "plead no prescription."

I should be glad to know, in all the revolutions in empire which have ever taken place, or may hereafter take place in the world, what the boundary line is which Mr. Burke would establish between the usurpation which creates the new government, and the possession which legitimates the usurpation? What statute of limitations he would set up to protect such a title? It is in the nature of things impossible. Titles to empire can neither be judged of by common rules, nor subjected to them. As power confers them, so power must uphold them. This power is seated in the aggregate will of the nation. We can limit the descent of the crown, we can mould and model it by act of parliament, because with us the will of the nation is delegated to its representatives, and the public voice speaks in an act of the legislature: but the time has been, when in this country the people have resumed into their own hands the power they committed to their representatives, when they have acted immediately from themselves without the intervention of any intermediate authority. This is a right inherent in the people, which no prescription to the contrary, no interruption of usage, can take from them; sparingly and cautiously to be exercised I admit, and in extreme cases only when their best and dearest privileges are invaded, their most sacred rights trampled on, their religious
 and

and political existence endangered : then they have the right ; they have in their own hands the power of doing justice to their own cause. An awful reflection this to all governments which abuse their authority ! because the indignation of the people, when let loose, like a sweeping torrent, carries down all before it, and indiscriminately levels every distinction which political convenience had set up.

I cannot but be amazed that Mr. Burke, who, from his early habits, and the whole tenor of his political life, must have studied and understood, as well as any man, what are termed whig principles, and who must, therefore, recognise the right which I contend to be vested in the people, should, notwithstanding, plead prescription for the abuses which existed in the old government of France ; or contend, that because all opposition to them had been silenced, it was not competent to the people to exert an opposition when the will of the nation called it forth into action.

Another error of Mr. Burke's, not of less magnitude than the former, appears to me to be this : that he charges all the crimes and enormities of individuals, or particular bodies of men, who have taken any part in the revolution, on the mass and body of the nation now consolidated into one republic.

“ This

“ This pretended Republic,” says he, “ is founded in crimes, and exists by wrong and robbery ; and wrong and robbery, far from a title to any thing, is war with mankind.”

This is a very general and unqualified assertion. Crimes have certainly been committed of a black and heinous nature ; humanity has been greatly outraged, and surrounding nations have beheld with indignation and abhorrence the popular excesses which have disgraced, for a season, the cause of freedom. On the commission of these crimes there is but one opinion : Mr. Burke and Mr. Fox, the friends and the enemies to the war, men of all parties in the state, equally lament, equally condemn the perpetration of these enormities. But even supposing that the Republic, in its origin, was founded in crimes and in robbery, I am not convinced, that at another period of its existence, and under very different circumstances from its commencement, this charge, if brought home to the Republic, ought to subject it to the political excommunication which Mr. Burke so authoritatively pronounces. Other republics, much more renowned than the French, were founded in wrong, and robbery, and rape.

*Sic fortis Etruria crevit,
Scilicet, et rerum tacta est pulcherrima Roma.*

As

As in morals, so in politics, "offences must come;" few great revolutions in government have ever taken place without them; but is it just that the many should be branded with ignominy for the offences of the few?

In all forms of government, whether monarchical or republican, the change produced, or the usurpation effected, is, politically speaking, in a great measure legalized, if it is stamped with the consent and approbation of the people. The offence is buried in the success of the measure.

But Mr. Burke assimilates what has taken place in France to the rising of Cade and his followers. Is the energy, then, of twenty-five millions of men directed to one object, the establishment of a republic, to be compared with the scurvy troop of citizens, with Cade at their head, assembled on Blackheath? "Had Cade and his gang," says Mr. Burke, "got possession of London, they would not have been the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Common-Council:" certainly they would not; but if that paltry rising, (which is said by the best historical writers to have been only an experiment of the Duke of York's to try the temper of the people) had given birth to a general rising; if the country had groaned under great and intolerable grievances; if corruption had pervaded every office and every department of government; if the people, wearied
out

out with oppression, had been ripe for resistance, (I put an imaginary case for the sake of the argument) if this had been the situation of the country, and any popular rising, or any unforeseen and accidental circumstance had lighted the spark of disaffection which prevailed, then I know not what entire change and revolution of government might have followed; I know not to what dignities Cade and his associates might have been promoted. He might have been at the head of an executive directory, or minister for the department of foreign affairs; or, for aught I know, he might have proved another Robespierre, as cruel and as ignorant, and as firmly entrenched in power of his own creation.

In that case, however base the actors in the scene would have been, however violent and atrocious the conduct they pursued, yet the government they set up might have acquired strength and solidity by time, the only principle which ultimately gives authority to all revolutions, and removes those objections which attend the irregular steps by which they have been established.

The fortune of states, like that of individuals, is in the hand of Providence; we can reason very little *à priori* on their future destinies; they mock all the calculations we make of their probable grandeur or duration. This is a strong reason why we should suspend our judgment, or cautiously express it on

the rank and situation they may hereafter hold in the scale of nations. I will prophesy nothing, nor hazard a conjecture on the future destinies of France, lest what Agamemnon says to Chalcas should be applied to me.

Μάντι κακῶν, ὃ πάντοτε μοι τὸ χρηγυιον εἴπας

I have ventured to express what my ideas are of the policy she ought to pursue when a peace is made; I will add what I think is the line of conduct this country ought to pursue in relation to France, and to her own domestic œconomy. I begin with observing, that the peace must be made on a broad and sound foundation; it must have for its object to bury all past animosities, to remove all future jealousies between the two nations: as much as possible it must leave no room for new quarrels, no pretences for another rupture. This is obviously our interest, for if the peace we make is not cordial and sincere, if “it will but skin and film the ulcerous place, “whiles rank corruption, mining all within, infects “unseen,” instead of healing the wound, it will break out afresh; if we are obliged shortly to renew the war, what will be the situation of this country? Her fleets unmanned, and her armies disbanded; her present advantages resigned, and all her energies weakened; her alliance with Austria interrupted, if not broken, and the means of renewing the war so greatly diminished, the expence of only reinstating herself in the condition she stands in at present so

prodigiously augmented, that the feeble efforts of the state might then not improperly be compared with the last convulsive struggles of a dying man. I turn away from the picture. The *long war* Mr. Burke so warmly recommends would be ruinous in the end, but a short peace would be only the prelude to immediate destruction.

How then is this country to make itself respected? and what security does it possess against future aggression? This will, indeed, require all the thoughts and attention which a vigilant government can bestow. The first object, perhaps, to which it will direct its views, is a very popular part of our establishment, I mean the navy. This has always been considered as the bulwark of the country, and is obviously so from our insular situation; but the gallant actions performed in the course of the war on our own element, as we fondly call it, and the uniform success we have experienced at sea, whilst by land our allies, till very lately, have been as uniformly unsuccessful, are circumstances which have particularly endeared the navy of England to the people of England, and have rendered it a just subject of their praise and admiration. It would be wise in us, then, to avail ourselves of the national enthusiasm, to encourage its growth, and to profit by the effect it produces. Let us press into the service all the natural and the artificial advantages such a confidence bestows. Let the navy peace

establishment be placed on a large and liberal footing; and let the savings in all other departments of the state enable us to be comparatively prodigal in this. The invasion of these realms, and what is as much, perhaps, to be guarded against, all serious apprehensions of an invasion will be removed to a distance, as long as our fleets remain undisputed masters of the channel.

Another, and a very important object to which a wise government will direct its attention at the peace is, to the internal condition of the country, and the state of public opinion. In the loyalty and affections of the people consist the true riches and the inexhaustible resources of government. Is this fund yet untouched, or have the demands upon it of late been so large and pressing, as to endanger its credit and sufficiency? On this point there certainly exists a great difference of opinion: I will cautiously express myself, because I wish rather to heal than to expose the wounds which have been inflicted. My object is peace, and my language ought to be conciliatory: but great discontents certainly prevail, and those not alone occasioned, though greatly increased by the war. The voice of the nation is imperfectly heard in Parliament; the reform, which the people have long anxiously expected, has been adjourned *sine die*; their ablest advocate has at present withdrawn his services in their behalf. The circumstances of the times, and the example drawn from the

the

the French Revolution, have operated to their prejudice; and the representation of the people in Parliament is, perhaps, become as faulty in practice as it is perfect in theory.

But when peace is made, and government has time and leisure seriously to think on these subjects; when some of the objections which a war creates are removed, and others, from a maturer consideration, are found to have no existence, then, perhaps, Parliament may be disposed to set about this great work of reform in earnest; not such a visionary reform as the heated imagination of some inconsiderate men has suggested; not the impracticable scheme of annual Parliaments, and universal suffrage, but such a prudent and temperate amelioration; such an easy and gradual alteration in the system, as the collective wisdom of Parliament, pointed to that most important object, will be able to mature and digest.

It will not, perhaps, be one of the least benefits arising from a peace, that it may no longer be thought necessary to continue in force the bills lately passed to prevent seditious meetings. However laudable the object of those measures, men of the most unbiassed judgments, many, even of those who supported them, have considered them as innovations on the spirit and principles of the constitution.

If

If any portion of the people have at all wandered in their affections from this constitution, no measure is more likely to recall them home again, and re-establish their regard and love for it than to preserve it in a pure and unalloyed state, and freed from those corruptions which have insensibly crept into it.

The vicinage of France need not then alarm us. If faction and anarchy prevail there, we shall compare to them, with pride and satisfaction, the order and unanimity which reign in this happy country. If the interests of the Republic are consolidated, by means of wise laws and prudent councils, we shall have nothing to envy abroad; for we shall be in possession of every thing we desire at home. If these are the fruits of peace, we must welcome it as the harbinger of more real good to the country than an uninterrupted succession of conquests could bestow.

The last object I will mention, to which I conceive the policy of this country ought to be directed when a peace takes place, is to the re-establishment of her finances. In this measure seems to be involved the very being of the state. It will hardly be denied, that by this war we shall have added an hundred and twenty millions to the national debt, which now amounts, in round numbers, to three hundred and seventy millions; the interest of this sum added to the money appropriated for the sinking fund, together with the civil list, and other expences of government,

if

if peace was to be concluded by means of the present negotiation, would require taxes to the annual amount of twenty-one millions. This debt given, I say, in round numbers, with a view only to a general inference, cannot fail to strike us as alarmingly great; some effective means must be found to reduce it: the swift expences of a four years war have six times exceeded the amount of ten years savings. The million surplus has bought up about twenty millions; the war has created an hundred and twenty. This measure, therefore, must, I think, be considered as inadequate to any efficient reduction of the national debt, and can only be taken in aid of a more powerful and efficacious plan. It is not within the scope of these cursory remarks to enter more at large upon this subject. I only mean to insist, that a leading feature in the policy of our future conduct at the peace, ought to be a close and unremitting attention to the reduction of our enormous debt, which, as objects strike men in different lights, is to me that "vast tremendous unformed spectre in terrific guise," which Mr. Burke, with his magic pen, has depicted for the new order of things, issuing out of the tomb of the murdered monarchy in France.

Here I close my remarks. Since they went to the press, the political sky has been somewhat clouded, and the pending negotiation has not assumed

sumed a very promising appearance : but we must not yet despair of its success and happy termination. My prayers and my wishes are, I am persuaded, in unison with those of the country,

Quod felix faustumque fit.

Inner Temple, Nov. 25, 1796.

FINIS.



